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While still short of being entirely mainstream there does appear to be a growing recognition in both 
policy circles and academia that economic development is not brought about by autonomous profit-
maximising agents interacting anonymously through equilibrium markets.1 Rather, economic 
development is an inherently disequilibric process involving interactive and institutionally 
embedded processes in broader systems of firms, governments, research centres, universities, 
consultants, and other entities. These systems can tap into stocks of global knowledge and 
technologies, assimilate and adapt it to local circumstances, and create new knowledge or 
technologies. 
 Such broader production systems are conceptualised in several different ways in the literature, 
e.g. Lundvall et al.’s ‘national innovation systems’, Richard Whitley’s ‘business systems’, and 
Sanjaya Lall’s concept of ‘industrial technology development’. This paper identifies and outlines 
four different systemic approaches to economic development. All four approaches have primarily 
been developed to address nationally based institutional systems in advanced economies. 
 Both the ontological premises and the policy implications of these systemic approaches depart 
distinctly from the conventional orthodoxy on economic development as articulated in the 
‘Washington Consensus’ and its later derivatives. The article goes on to explore which policy 
implications the adoption of such a systemic view might have for the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD). 
 
Introduction 
NEPAD is a new continent-wide development programme with the long-term objectives of ‘poverty 
eradication, sustainable development, demarginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and 
promotion of the role of women in all activities’. Even though issues of political governance such as 
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peace and security, democratisation and human rights appears to dominate the rhetoric on NEPAD, 
the most concrete efforts and progress are so far concentrated in the more tractable domain of 
economic and corporate governance. Given that about half the population of Africa, or 340 million 
people, are living on less than one dollar a day and that life expectancy is only 47 years in sub-
Saharan Africa, economic development is indeed an urgent task. Regional integration too is not an 
unreasonable aspiration: it makes little economic sense for an economy smaller than that of France 
to be divided into 54 separate states. 
 From an immediate observation, it might appear inappropriate to apply frameworks, which have 
predominantly been developed in the context of economically advanced countries and which 
identify themselves with national systems to a regional initiative in a developing region: NEPAD 
implies elevating the focus from national to regional and subregional systems and surely the 
concerns of countries in the South are different from those in the North.  
 However, historically, and in fact still, nation states have been the main political, economic and 
institutional vehicles of economic development. As such, the frameworks with a national focus have 
been tied to the principal institutional vehicle for development, not to the nation state per se, and 
might equally well be applied to a regional initiative were such an initiative to assume any primacy. 
 What the relevance to developing countries is concerned, it is common in developing countries 
for production systems to be fragmented. This originates in part from short-lived and alternating 
development strategies and in part from the selective and also impermanent penetration by global 
production chains of local production systems (Gammeltoft 2001; 2003). The studies, which have 
documented the all to predictable fragmentation of innovation systems in developing countries, are 
already legio. So in this respect there may be limits to the analytical value of the national 
institutional frameworks. But the frameworks’ prescriptive value is only so much the greater: in 
most developing countries the further progress of production systems is contingent on increased 
institutional integration and diversification of production – of broader, deeper and tighter innovation 
systems. 
 NEPAD does in fact, at least in rhetoric, reflect the requisite perspective, resolve and long-term 
focus to accomplish this. African development is critically conditioned from outside the continent, 
e.g. by the unsustainable debt burden, stagnating or falling foreign investment, declining post-cold 
war aid budgets, and lingering protection and subsidies in Northern markets.2 However, progress 
depends equally critically on the configuration and development of internal institutional systems 
and NEPAD endeavours to address exactly such internal issues: it is promoted as the African side 
of a new deal between aid recipients and donors under which donors, in return, are expected to 
alleviate the external constraints. 
 To properly understand economic development processes, a systemic framework needs to be 
applied and a range of well-developed economic approaches do offer such frameworks. In the 
following we will outline four such approaches. In the account here we will predominantly draw on 
to development experiences from the successful East Asian states. The paper goes on to account for 
the background and constitution of the NEPAD initiative, and finally the conclusion explores the 
potential policy implications for NEPAD of adopting a systemic approach to development. 
 
The Institutional Embeddedness of Production Systems 
Even though enterprises are the primary drivers of growth, productivity and technological 
development, economic development involves much more than individual enterprises: enterprises 
do not emerge and succeed individually but in the context of wider production systems. Work in a 
                                                 
2 It is often argued that a major reason for Africa’s predicament is its insufficient integration into world markets. 
However Amin (2002) observes that Africa is in fact more integrated into the global economy in terms of the share 
of its external trade in GDP than other regions. Accordingly, it is not the extent but the modality of integration, 
which should be of concern. Measures to improve it would include upgrading beyond agricultural produce and 
extraction industries strengthening and diversifying manufacturing production. 
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wide range of disciplines such as economic sociology, economic geography, economic history, 
industrial organisation, business studies, and development studies informs us of the many ways in 
which economic activities take place within and are structured by various humanly-constituted and 
devised structures. In a profound way, these approaches challenge the neoclassical perception of 
perfectly informed individual agents interacting instantly and costlessly through perfect markets and 
address the various ways in which economic activities are embedded in and influenced by a wider 
social context. There is also an implication that these issues significantly influence the performance 
of firms, beyond efficient markets, a stable and predictable legal system, macroeconomic stability, 
etc. Accordingly, there are two different sides to embeddedness: one is embeddedness as a basic 
and insurmountable structural fact of economic life; the other is the utilitarian side of embeddedness 
as a source of competitiveness.3 With respect to the latter, Hollingsworth et al. (1994) maintain that 
the effect of domestic institutions on the international performance of a sector or economy often 
seems paradoxical, difficult to predict, and unintended. Yet, based on a selection of country studies, 
they conclude the following: 
 
[…] the chapters in this volume offer strong evidence that institutionally rich domestic regimes capable of 
overriding or supplementing the logic of markets and hierarchies may help ‘their’ firms prevail over 
competitors based in institutionally impoverished, neoclassical, market and hierarchy-driven governance 
systems. (ibid:  282) 
 
Michael Porter (1990) convincingly argues for the importance of considering industries rather than 
individual firms and observes that countries usually succeed only in a limited number of industries, 
and internationally each industry tends to be dominated by players from only a few countries, which 
have grown out of a strong home base.4 
 To properly understand economic development processes, a holistic framework needs to be 
applied. A range of well-developed economic approaches do offer such frameworks and we will 
outline and summarise four of them in the following: the national innovation system and the 
business system approaches, Sanjaya Lall’s concept of ‘industrial technology development’ and a 
body of literature on industrial policy. 
 Applying a holistic perspective also has implications for the role of policy in development: the 
need for government intervention in the presence of certain market failures is generally accepted. 
More contested is the need for broader government activism to bring various markets and actors 
operating in them into existence and guide their development. There is also a general consensus as 
to the significance of macroeconomic stability, human resource development, high savings and 
investment rates, and export orientation, but if we consider government policies and programmes 
targeted more specifically at economic, industrial and technological advance, we move into highly 
contested grounds. 
 Evolutionary economists and authors within the capability tradition convincingly argue that the 
complexities of economic development take policy far beyond the generally accepted market 
failures. Even if one accepts that interventions are warranted in order to remedy information failures 
and co-ordination problems between whatever activities may already be present in an economy, 
economic development goes beyond this and depends on uncertain, long-term, and complex 
learning processes of a cumulative and path-dependent nature on the part of a diverse range of 
economic actors. In mature and developed economies, marginalist preoccupations with attaining 
productive efficiency, i.e. appropriate composition of inputs given relative scarcities/prices, and 
                                                 
3 Of course, economic efficiency is not the universal performance measure it is sometimes taken to be. Non-economic 
goals aside, a variety of economic ones may be pursued, e.g. maximum profitability, growth, technological advance, 
or market share. Additionally, dominant goals vary between social contexts. 
4 Among the criticisms made against Porter’s work has been that he downplays the role of transnational companies, 
places too much emphasis on the role of the domestic vis-à-vis foreign markets, and relatively neglects the role of 
governments and the wider institutional framework in which industries operate; arguments which are particularly 
warranted in the context of developing countries. A likely reason for these shortcomings is that Porter bases his 
analysis on developed economies and pays only marginal attention to developing countries.  
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allocative efficiency, i.e. appropriate allocation across activities, may to a wide extent be warranted. 
Dynamic investment and growth processes, on the other hand, are fundamentally different and 
associated with complicated structural problems. Agents, markets, and prices are not given but may 
be absent, weak and inadequate, and highly variable and contingent on the specific course of the 
development process. The distribution of resources between different activities in firms and 
between different firms, sectors, and even countries needs to take account of linkage and spill-over 
effects, social benefits, and learning costs and effects. Different benefits may be associated with 
different sectors or technologies at different points in time; the viability of a sector may depend on a 
wider ‘cluster’ of activities (Porter 1990); and clustering may require learning processes to be 
collective and coordinated between firms (Lall and Teubal (1998) introduce the concept of 
‘collective learning’). Technological development in firms and nations depends not only on well-
functioning markets but on a wider institutional framework. Gereffi (1995), for instance, maintains 
that for newly industrialised countries to continue to prosper, they need to ‘[…] devise strategies 
that emphasize the creation of a local institutional environment conducive to technological 
upgrading and the integration of industrial production with modern services’ (p. 101), and 
according to Mowery and Oxley (1995), the countries which benefit most from access to foreign 
technology are those with public policies strengthening their ‘national absorptive capacity’. Yet, as 
pointed out by Nelson (1993), efforts by government and institutions can support but not substitute 
the technological efforts of firms. If one accepts that these fundamental differences exist between 
processes of dynamic growth and static allocation, this strongly influences the extent and type of 
policy intervention conceivable. 
 
National Systems of Innovation 
The ‘national systems of innovation’ (NSI) approach can be seen as a subapproach within a broader 
neo-Schumpeterian tradition, which along with other heterodox perspectives has flourished since 
the 1970s. At that time, the slowdown of growth in the advanced industrial nations, the economic 
and technological rise of Japan and later the NICs, along with the inability of mainstream 
economics to account for these new developments, caused academic and policy efforts to branch off 
into new directions, in part to maintain growth, employment and competitiveness. Furthermore, the 
progress of the NICs raised the question of how that progress came about and whether and how it 
might be emulated by other nations through national policies. Within the neo-Schumpeterian 
literature, two different lines of enquiry can in turn be discerned: one is based on and expands the 
work of Schumpeter and deals with the role of technology as the force underlying and shaping long-
run economic development (e.g. Freeman 1982; Dosi et al. 1988; Nelson and Winter 1982). The 
aim seems to be a general theory of economic development, and accordingly the focus is on 
innovations at the technological frontier, radical innovations with the potential to transform 
companies and economies at large. The focus is on the technological change process itself, the 
inherent characteristics of technology, innovation, and firms and how these phenomena are related. 
Accordingly, it deals more with the advancement of the technological frontier than with the process 
of catching-up, which is more central to the concerns of developing countries. The other line of 
enquiry, the NSI-approach, focuses more on the institutional context in which technological 
development takes place, and the factors which impede or promote it (e.g. Freeman 1987; Lundvall 
1992a; Nelson 1993). It is more policy oriented and operates with a wider conception of innovation, 
including changes new to the innovator rather than to the world. More weight is placed on 
incremental innovations and diffusion.5 With a focus on micro-level phenomena, institutions and 
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is more important to economic growth than radical changes, and that social innovations are as important as technical 
ones (Freeman 1994). The issue has also become prominent in the World Development Reports, with the 1991 report 
(World Bank 1991) concluding that intangible investment in knowledge accumulation has become more important 
than physical capital investment, and with the 1998 report (World Bank 1998) dedicated to the subject ‘knowledge 
for development’. 
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change processes rather than equilibrium, it shares commonalities with development economics. 
Individual studies and scholars often relate to both these lines of neo-schumpeterian enquiry, but 
they are nevertheless analytically distinct. In addition to the NIS literature we will here also 
consider Sanjaya Lall’s two related concepts of ‘national technological capabilities’ and ‘industrial 
technology development’.  
 A variety of definitions of NSI can be found in the literature, for example: ‘ [...] the network of 
institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, 
modify and diffuse new technologies’ (Freeman 1987). ‘[...] a set of institutions whose interactions 
determine the innovative performance [...] of national firms’ (Nelson 1993). ‘ [...] the national 
institutions, their incentive structures and their competencies, that determine the rate and direction 
of technological learning (or the volume and composition of change-generating activities) in a 
country’ (Patel and Pavitt 1994). ‘[...] that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually 
contribute to the development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework 
within which governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As 
such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills 
and artefacts which define new technologies’ (Metcalfe 1995). ‘ [...] the elements and relationships 
which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge [...] 
and are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state’ (Lundvall 1992a). 
Lundvall further proposes a narrow and a broad definition: the narrow one would include 
organisations and institutions involved in searching and exploring, such as R&D departments, 
technological institutes and universities, whereas the broad definition includes ‘all parts and aspects 
of the economic structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning as well as searching and 
exploring – the production system, the marketing system and the system of finance [...]’ (p.12) and 
stresses that the way the different elements of the NSI interact is as important as their individual 
characteristics. In fact, NSI is usually quite fuzzily defined, and definitions seem to mainly be 
deducted from the three core words ‘national’, ‘system’, and ‘innovation’. 
 Innovation and change requires knowledge, which is acquired through learning. Learning is 
considered an interactive and socially embedded process, which must be considered in its 
institutional and cultural context. A particularly important part of that context is the modern nation 
state, today just as it was it during the industrialisation of the western world. The literature 
emphasises that change and learning do not come about only, or even predominantly, through 
purposive activities such as R&D. They also take place as part of every-day activities in and 
between firms: in firms, experience from everyday activities determines the direction of innovation 
and produces the necessary knowledge and insights for it. As an example, studies have documented 
that the proximity between R&D, production, and marketing is critical for the innovative capability 
of firms, and that this is an area in which American and Japanese companies differ, with Japanese 
companies being more integrated (Freeman 1994: 472). Since innovation also emanates from 
routine activities it follows that technical advance is likely to take place in areas in which a nation is 
already engaged in routine activities (Lundvall 1992a: 9). 
 Between firms, the importance of interactions between users and producers in change processes 
has been particularly emphasised (Lundvall 1992b; Fagerberg 1993, 1995; Porter 1990). A basic 
premise is the fact that the modern economy is characterised by ubiquitous innovation and a highly 
developed vertical division of labour. Much innovation occurs in the form of product innovation as 
a result of interactions between users and producers, rather than as process innovations internal to 
firms. Exchange of information and perhaps direct cooperation is necessary to reconcile the needs 
of users with the technical opportunities of producers. Such interactions are often of a longer-term 
nature and at odds with the neo-classical depiction of anonymous agents interacting at arms length 
through the market. Furthermore, given that such processes may be characterised by a high degree 
of uncertainty both in terms of outcome and of the process of interacting itself, transaction cost 
theory (Williamson 1985) predicts that vertical integration would occur, transforming product 
innovation into process innovation. This, however, does not seem to be the case, among the reasons 
being that vertically integrated units would become less able to interact with other organisational 
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units than the one with which they integrated, and that integration tends to increase efficiency but 
decrease flexibility (Lundvall 1992b). Geographic and particularly cultural proximity affects these 
processes of interactive learning, supporting the relevance of a national focus. 
 Besides the activities of firms themselves, institutions, in firms, between firms and at the 
national level, are the second important dimension of innovation systems. Lundvall regards them as 
essential because they provide a stability, which is perceived as necessary for innovative efforts to 
take place and to be successful. ‘Technological trajectories’ or ‘paradigms’ are regarded as one 
special kind of institution, which focuses on the innovative activities of scientists, engineers and 
technicians. Innovation often involves ‘interactive learning’ between multiple agents and it can 
occur between firms and supporting institutions. This is, in fact, a very important observation which 
one may expand into the requirement that learning occurs in the form of mutual and complementary 
processes in productive firms and other institutions: much of the literature focuses more one-sidedly 
on learning processes in firms and how these should and may or may not be institutionally 
supported. Much less explored is the requirement that supporting institutions themselves learn and 
how such learning occurs. An important source of institutional learning is the interactions with the 
firms those institutions support. Through such learning, institutions may serve as repositories of 
knowledge for firms interacting with them or, differently phrased, as mediators of externalities.  
 While his primary focus is firm-level technological capabilities, Lall (1992) introduces an 
alternative holistic concept, viz. ‘national technological capabilities’ (NTC), closely related to that 
of NSI. National technological capabilities are reflected in countries’ different performance in 
productivity, growth and trade, and consist of the interplay between capabilities, incentives and 
institutions. The capabilities of a country define the best that can be achieved, whereas the 
incentives guide the use of the capabilities. Both capabilities and incentives operate within and are 
influenced by an institutional framework. Capabilities encompass physical investment, human 
capital and technological effort, which are strongly interlinked: investments are useless if the skills 
and knowledge (‘human capital’) to operate the facilities is not developed, and so is the formation 
of formal skills without conscious efforts (‘technological effort’) to utilise them. National 
technological effort comprises efforts on the part of firms to assimilate and improve upon 
technology, backed up by a technological infrastructure that provides information, standards, basic 
scientific knowledge and various facilities. 
 Incentives arising from market forces, institutional functioning and government functioning 
affect the pace of accumulation of capital and skills; the types of capital purchased and the kinds of 
skills learned; and the extent to which existing endowments are exploited in production. Needless to 
say, government policies are central in shaping incentives, but may do so either positively as when 
remedying structural and market failures, or negatively as when interventions are ill conceived or 
implemented. Incentives are subdivided into macroeconomic incentives, incentives from 
competition, and incentives from factor markets. Capabilities are formed and incentives asserted 
through institutions. Even though this makes them central to the formation of NTC, Lall does not 
address them in much detail, probably because they are not easily dealt with within an economic 
framework. He merely notes that they encompass the legal framework, industrial institutions, 
training institutions and technology institutions without being more specific. Fortunately, precisely 
institutions are at the forefront of the NSI-literature, in line with its more conceptual rather than 
formal approach. 
 In a later article, Lall (1993) operates with a different but overlapping concept: firm-level 
technological capabilities are developed through the process of ‘industrial technology development’ 
(ITD), which in turns consists of (1) the incentive structure facing firms; (2) the availability of the 
right quantity and quality of skills; (3) the availability of technical information and support services; 
(4) finance for ITD investments; and (5) the technology policies of the government. There are 
possible market failures and government remedies associated with each of the ITD components, 
which leads to the role and form of government intervention. Lall (1992) maintains that competition 
is the most basic incentive affecting capability development but adds that government intervention 
in a wide variety of areas is necessary. If a country chooses to rely on foreign investors for all 
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difficult technological work, the learning process will be curtailed and industrialisation remain in 
less dynamic paths (Lall 1993). He clarifies the circumstances under which intervention is justified: 
if the source of market failure lies outside the firm (e.g. lack of skills, infrastructure, institutions) 
intervention to protect the firm will be ineffective. If failures arise from firms’ own lack of 
investment in capability building, due to externalities (loss of skills or technology, or 
interdependencies between firms), risk aversion, or lack of information, intervention may improve 
resource allocation. But under such circumstances, subsidies are preferable to tariffs due to lower 
consumption costs, even though more difficult to administer. It should be noted that this last 
recommendation runs counter to conventional economic orthodoxy. 
 
Business Systems 
In his research programme on ‘business systems’, Richard Whitley (1992, 1996, 1998, 1999) deals 
with how economic activities are organised, controlled and coordinated differently in different 
institutional contexts, resulting in a variety of distinct ‘capitalisms’. Whitley’s agenda is dual: first, 
he wants to explain how and why different ways of organising capitalist economies have developed 
and continue to be distinct, by reference to variations in particular societal institutions. Second, he 
wants to develop a comprehensive framework for comparing and contrasting ‘systems of economic 
coordination and control’, a framework which ‘[…] attempts to identify the critical processes by 
which they become established, reproduced, and changed as relatively integrated and distinctive 
business systems’ (Whitley 1999: 15).6 Such an approach can potentially bring more empirical and 
analytical detail to the study of the embeddedness of economic life, while remaining abstract 
enough to be broadly applicable.  
 Economic activities and relationships are considered as socially constituted and institutionally 
variable, so that competitive processes, economic agents engaging in them, and their outcomes vary 
between societal contexts. Consequently, the approach dissolves the conventional market/hierarchy 
dichotomy and shows that ‘firms’ and ‘markets’ in fact refer to different institutional entities in 
different societies, depending on how economic activities are actually conducted and organised. 
Authoritative coordination may penetrate unequally within firms as well as span over different 
firms, e.g. through cartels, profit-pooling associations, obligational contracting, business groups, 
and various inter-firm networks. Business systems are distinguished on the basis of the organisation 
of ownership and control, particularly the relationship between owners and managers, and vertical 
and horizontal integration of production; relationships between separate firms such as forms of 
coordination with suppliers, customers, and competitors; and employer-employee relationships in 
firms, e.g. adversarial vs. collaborative. Whitley conceives of business systems as follows: 
 
Business systems are conceived here, then, as distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in 
their degree and mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the organization of, and 
interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees. Differences in the nature of 
relationships between five broad kinds of economic actors are particularly important in contrasting 
business systems: (a) providers and users of capital, (b) customers and suppliers, (c) competitors, (d) 
firms in different sectors, and, finally, (e) employers and different kinds of employees. These vary in both 
the extent of organizational integration and whether this is achieved primarily through ownership-based 
hierarchies, formal agreements, personal obligations, informal commitments, etc. (Whitley 1999:33) 
 
Thus the nature of firms as quasi-autonomous economic actors, their internal structures and their 
interdependencies are all interrelated and differ significantly between institutional contexts. (Whitley 
1992: 10) 
 
Business systems are characterised in terms of a range of specific properties, but even though the 
                                                 
6 Other researchers pursue similar agendas but without aspiring to construct as systematic a framework as Whitley: 
Herrigel (1996, 1994) on ‘industrial orders’; Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) on ‘social systems of production’; and 
Orrù, Biggart, and Hamilton (1997) on East Asian business groups.  
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arithmetical combination of properties results in a large number of conceivable business systems, 
the fact that these properties are determined and restricted by underlying institutions and the fact 
that particular institutions will tend to have the same kind of impact on different business system 
properties, the number of business systems which become established and are stable is limited. For 
example, in a setting in which market competition is encouraged and relations between firms are 
arms-length and adversarial, employer-employee relationships will tend to share those properties. 
Furthermore, particular combinations of institutions may not be stable but result in conflicts 
between different social groupings. These various constraints leads to the identification of six major 
ideal types of business systems: (1) fragmented (e.g. Hong Kong); (2) coordinated industrial district 
(e.g. ‘Third Italy’, Baden-Würtemberg); (3) compartmentalised (e.g. Anglo-Saxon economies); (4) 
state-organised (e.g. South Korea); (5) collaborative (e.g. continental European); and (6) highly 
coordinated (e.g. Japan). 
 Business systems have typically come into being during the process of industrialisation, shaped 
by prevailing institutions dealing with the constitution and control of resources such as skills, 
capital and legitimacy. These underlying institutions, which vary across societal contexts, account 
for the constitution, change, relative persistency, and variability of business systems. Institutions 
may be more or less coherent, integrated, and mutually reinforcing. If very much so, distinctive 
business systems will develop, if less so multiple contending principles of economic organisation 
may co-exist. Japan and Germany, for instance, are taken to represent more coherent and distinct 
business systems than the U.S.. The most important institutions are those associated with the state 
and its policies; with the financial system; with the labour market; and with trust and authority 
relations. It is the close relationship between underlying institutions and economic activities which 
accounts for the observed uniformity of organisational forms within societies. Societal institutions, 
in turn, come about through struggles between different economic interest groups and industrial 
sectors and their political equivalents. Since such political struggles are continuously ongoing, 
institutions and the business systems they give rise to are subject to changes. Whitley proposes a 
number of relationships between societal institutions and business system characteristics, but it is 
only if the institutional features in question are sufficiently ‘strong’ and possibly in accordance with 
other institutional features that the particular business system characteristic arises. 
 Whitley’s approach is primarily developed on the basis of relatively advanced economies with 
strong and distinct institutions in which industrialisation has either to a large extent been relatively 
endogenous to the countries in question (Europe, U.S.) or progressed under considerable state 
guidance (East Asia). Countries in other regions such as Latin America, with states penetrated by 
landed aristocracy; Africa, where the economy is under state control to a much more modest extent 
than in the East Asian developmental states; and Southeast Asia, which also tends to be 
characterised by relatively weak states, are only peripherally addressed. Generally, it seems that the 
framework may be less applicable to developing countries: Whitley himself argues that coherent 
and mutually reinforcing national institutions are a precondition for a distinct business system to 
develop, and this requirement is rarely fulfilled in developing countries where states tend to be 
weak, both in terms of competencies and insulation; labour markets fragmented and unorganised; 
and financial systems immature. In developing countries where TNCs may control the most 
dynamic sectors, and local institutions are not ‘distinct and integrated’, if one can speak of national 
business systems at all they will have developed under considerable foreign influence and not result 
from local institutions to the extent Whitley assumes. These objections relate to Whitley’s general 
focus on developed economies. Less developed economies are not systematically dealt with but he 
does speculate that foreign investment into less industrialised economies may result in the transfer 
of business system characteristics to the host. If foreign firms dominate an economy or particular 
sectors in it, that economy is unlikely to develop its own distinctive pattern of economic 
coordination and control, particularly if the foreign firms tend to originate from the same country 
and that country has a strongly articulated business system. Furthermore, the more independently 
foreign firms can operate from domestic organisations, agencies, and practices, the more likely it is 
that business system properties will be transferred. Japanese companies, for example, linked to 
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Japanese suppliers and banks, can be more independent from local practices than US companies, 
which tend to become more entangled with local organisations. The weaker the local business 
system, the greater the potential impact. But Whitley retains the primacy of national systems by 
stating that ‘even in industrializing countries where a particular system of capitalist organization is 
in the process of being established, foreign investment does not necessarily determine the shape of 
the emergent economy, especially where the state plays a dominating role in organizing economic 
development and effectively controls the degree and nature of that investment’.  
 Regardless of these issues, Whitley’s basic contention that different and relatively stable 
business systems exist at the national level, particularly in developed economies, and do not 
converge in the short run, and in the long run only if certain institutional conditions are fulfilled; 
and that the constitution and development of these business systems are institutionally determined 
remains very enlightening and pertinent and testifies to as well as elucidates the embeddedness of 
economic activities. 
 
Industrial Policy 
A third and distinct debate, which shares the national focus, yet with its own history, focus, and 
agenda, is the one concerning industrial policy. The current section deals with this question through 
the following series of subquestions: what is the rationale for government intervention in relation to 
economic development? Are there any general requirements for policies? Which specific areas are 
candidates for interventions, and which techniques may be applied? 
 The activism of governments of the successful East Asian states has been amply documented in 
the literature and we will illustrate the issues involved in industrial policy by drawing on the East 
Asian experiences.7 In the following sections, we will consider four broad areas of industrial policy 
and the techniques associated with them: the creation and nurturing of markets and agents, 
industrial organisation, the institutional infrastructure, and the regulatory framework.  
 
Agents and markets 
Markets are not universal, spatially and temporally uniform entities but are institutionally 
constituted and vary between contexts. Both markets and the economic agents operating in them 
may need to be created and nurtured. The Korean government’s promotion of the chaebol is a 
prominent case in point. The large domestic business groups were a means to economise on limited 
local entrepreneurial and financial resources and to internalise deficient markets for capital, skills, 
information, and entrepreneurship. Their size allowed economies of scale to be attained and they 
were used to enter ‘strategic industries’. By design a symbiotic relationship between government 
and the chaebol was created in which government was able to generate investment opportunities 
and the chaebol subsequently responded to them. Government ‘led the market’, as Wade (1990) has 
put it. 
 At an early stage, an industry’s activities may be confined to assembly of imported parts and 
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effect of such interventions is virtually impossible and a vivid dispute has flourished around the issue. According to 
various neoclassicists, there is nothing remarkable, let alone ‘miraculous’, about the economic growth of the East 
Asian states (Krugman 1994; Young 1989, 1994): through econometric analyses they claim to have demonstrated 
that economic growth has been the result of a massive but unsustainable growth in the mobilisation of conventional 
resources, capital and labour, and human resource development, not activist policies. On the other side of the fence, a 
group of ‘statist’ writers argue that industrial policies and selective interventions have been pivotal, and that states 
have ‘led the market’ in the face of widespread market failure (Skocpol et al. 1985; Evans et al. 1985; Amsden 1989; 
Wade 1990; Kim & Dahlman 1992; Evans 1995; Amsden 1997). Where neo-classicists attribute part of the success 
of the East Asian states to the absence of price controls and other ‘distortionary policies’, Amsden (1989), for 
instance, maintains that government deliberately ‘got the prices wrong’ to direct investments into industries which 
would generate the highest overall growth for the economy. 
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components on the basis of foreign technology and know-how. Once assembly activities reach 
sufficient scale, and as technical, organisational, and managerial learning progress, a broader range 
of related and specialised activities may be undertaken locally. If assembly industries are locally 
owned and managed, the capabilities necessary to branch into new activities may to a considerable 
extent be acquired through the assembly activity; if they are foreign owned and managed, more of 
the capabilities must be acquired elsewhere. Specialised technological agents such as engineering 
firms, intermediate-goods producers, and capital goods suppliers, may act as repositories of 
technological capabilities and diffuse technology between firms. Flows through such intermediaries 
are often far more important than those directly between competing firms (Dahlman et al. 1987). 
Close interactions between these agents and their customers also ensure the development of local 
capabilities which match local needs. To nurture such complementary activities, governments have 
in the past set specific targets for machinery, parts, and raw materials that should be localised but 
such ‘local content’ policies have become disallowed under the WTO TRIMS agreements. Other 
possible measures are tax incentives, preferential financing, loan guarantees, and R&D subsidies. In 
Korea, some local activities were supported by requiring by law that projects should be given to 
local firms, possibly with foreign minority partners whenever possible; and quantitative import 
restrictions, import licensing, domestic content and other techniques were used to promote the 
development of local capital goods industries.8 Besides promoting specific agents, government may 
also encourage companies to enter particular technologically demanding areas or target specific 
activities in firms such as R&D or training. 
 For various reasons, countries frequently target particular infant industries for certain periods, 
among the reasons being that advance in various ‘base industries’ such as information technology, 
new materials, and biotechnology may influence strength in downstream industries, so that 
countries cannot afford to let these sectors be exclusively controlled by foreign firms. A converse 
argument is that demand from strong downstream industries may be necessary to develop upstream 
component industries. More generally, technological linkages between firms may require that whole 
groups of activities are promoted as infant industries, since this will allow learning processes in 
individual companies to be co-ordinated. Furthermore, some groups of activities may be more 
beneficial to an economy than others at a given level of development. Lall (1993) observes that 
successful infant industry promotion in Korea targeted sectors with significant externalities and 
linkage potentials. Interventions were not directed at isolated products or technologies but based on 
a broader plan taking their interrelationships into account.9 Complacency on the part of protected 
firms, which would be contradictory to the purpose of protection, was a real risk but could be 
addressed by limiting protection, imposing performance requirements, or enforcing early entry into 
export markets while maintaining domestic protection.  
 Public enterprises have been common in activities where social benefits considerably outweigh 
private, in capital and technology intensive areas, and areas, which for one reason or another are 
considered nationally ‘strategic’. Beyond the capabilities developed in these enterprises themselves, 
technology may be diffused into private industry through the linkages they form and through labour 
mobility. In Taiwan, which did not have Korea’s large business groups, public enterprises were 
used to enter particularly difficult or capital-intensive activities. Public procurement policies and 
localisation schemes have been applied to initiate local production of goods, intermediate goods, 
and production equipment. In Korea, the government announced procurement plans under which 
contracts were granted based on both cost and quality considerations. Such contracts induced 
activities in particular areas and at the same time provided secure income to companies in the 
                                                 
8 Selective techniques are generally no longer permitted under the WTO. However what subsidies is concerned, 
countries with less than $1,000 per capita GNP are exempted from the prohibition on export subsidies and have a 
time-bound exemption from other prohibited subsidies.  
9 More specifically, he finds that the following requirements must be fulfilled for interventions to be likely to succeed: 
(1) targeted industries must realistically be able to reach world level of efficiency in the foreseeable future; (2) only a 
few infants should be promoted at any given time due to scarcity of resources; (3) performance requirements, such as 
exports, must be made to avoid promotion leading to complacency rather than upgrading; (4) complementarities to 
the industry, supporting industries, skill base, finance, must be dealt with concurrently.  
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process of undertaking risky investments in other areas, such as semiconductors.10  
 
Industrial organisation 
Besides promoting particular markets and agents there may also be a role for government in shaping 
the way agents interact and the way industrial activities are organised. As a production system 
develops, more and more advanced activities will be undertaken locally, and linkages between 
activities become more complex. In some instances, firms may not initiate activities even though 
they would be socially beneficial because of externalities, inability to appropriate the benefits, or 
information or coordination failures. One can also envision instances in which incentives may 
encourage firms to undertake activities, which would be socially undesirable because they diverted 
resources away from other activities, which were more appropriate with respect to a wider 
development strategy. Government may need to encourage the establishment and use of various 
supporting industries, as referred to above. Even neoclassical economists who recognise that 
products and technology are not perfectly tradable emphasise the need to facilitate the flow of 
information and to coordinate investment decisions. Based on case studies of fifteen countries, 
Nelson (1996) finds that many countries encourage cooperation between private firms in R&D. 
Pack and Westphal (1986) address the issue that previously transferred technology may be 
incompletely mastered and productivity therefore reduced due to insufficient diffusion of 
knowledge about production engineering, inadequate product specialisation among firms making 
similar products, and an insufficient extent of subcontracting. They assess that increasing technical 
efficiency by addressing these issues can lead to benefits in the range from 30 to 50 percent of 
existing production. The absence of subcontracting is likely to result in different firms internalising 
the same activity, all operating it below full utilisation. If too many firms produce the same product, 
the advantages of specialisation may be foregone, a risk which may be reduced by government 
intervention, e.g. by encouraging rationalisation cartels among private industries.  In the later stages 
of Korean industrialisation, various curbs were placed on the chaebol to avoid collusive practices 
and excessive vertical and horizontal integration. Government also responded to an imbalance 
between large and small business sectors and promoted small and medium industries (SMIs), 
particularly technology-based firms. Export processing zones and industrial districts have been 
important in providing companies with physical and institutional infrastructure and facilitating 
cooperation between foreign and local companies, and among local companies themselves.  
 
Institutional infrastructure 
Beyond extending support to individual firms, the institutional infrastructure may also function as a 
repository for accumulation of capabilities, and a channel through which information and also 
manpower can diffuse between firms. Here we consider the following parts of the institutional 
infrastructure: human resource development, the science and technology (S&T) infrastructure, 
industrial extension, government-business deliberation, and finance.  
 The heavy investment in human resources in general and technical training in particular is 
usually highlighted as one of the most important prerequisites for the rapid economic development 
in East Asian nations. Obviously, the composition and level of skills required varies as 
industrialisation proceeds. The overseas training and hiring of returnees are also frequently cited as 
important. Based on a fifteen-country case study, Nelson (1996) finds that the education of the 
workforce is one of the factors that has the most profound impact on innovation, and more 
specifically that a major determinant of the success of infant industry protection programmes is the 
quality of the education and training system and the extent to which it provides firms with the 
                                                 
10 Under the plurilateral agreement on government procurement administered by the WTO, local and foreign companies 
should be treated equally. However, so far only 28 out of the 146 WTO member countries are signatories to the 
agreement. 
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strong skills needed to make it on their own. On this backdrop, policy recommendations may be to 
encourage industrial training by subsidies to or levies on firms; to increase enrolment rates with a 
focus on technical fields; to gear training to emerging technological needs; and to get industry 
involved in the management of training and education institutions. 
 Besides human resource development, a well developed local S&T infrastructure can induce the 
choice of socially appropriate techniques, improve the terms of technology imports, and stimulate 
capability development in local productive enterprises and specialised technological agents. Nelson 
(1996) finds that the relationship between public R&D efforts and industrial success differs from 
case to case, but generally benefits seem to depend on tight linkages between the public 
programmes and the industry involved, linkages between specific firms or group of firms and 
specific laboratories, research programmes or individuals. Government laboratories may spearhead 
the development of new technologies, but generally policies directed at the diffusion and 
application of technology, bringing industries up to world practice or spreading knowledge about 
new developments, can be more effective than the subsidisation of major breakthroughs. Since 
individual companies may not be able to appropriate the benefits of information gathering related to 
technology acquisition and absorption, and since such gathering is associated with large fixed costs, 
government may induce industry-wide efforts, possible with some compulsion to curb free riding. 
In Korea, public research institutions played an important role in identifying technology sources 
and disseminating information to local firms, strengthening their bargaining position, and in 
Taiwan, public research institutions were active in importing technologies and diffusing them into 
SMEs. Experienced researchers also migrated from public institutions into budding corporate R&D 
centres, and studies suggest that the main economic benefit from research activities is not the formal 
output as such but the resulting supply of scientists and engineers, their skills and network 
engagements (Bell & Pavitt 1993). Public research institutions played a limited role in the early 
stages of Korean industrialisation, partly because their services were not in high demand, and partly 
because they did not have the requisite know-how and experience, but they took on increasing 
importance as manufacturers moved into less mature technologies and then various agencies were 
established to help industries acquire technology.11 As domestic demand rose, a number of 
specialised research institutes spun off from the original one, KAIST, pioneered new products and 
processes and adapted and improved foreign technologies in areas such as shipbuilding, marine 
resources, electronics, telecommunications, energy, machinery, chemicals, and standardisation.  
 A common problem with publicly provided R&D and extension services seems to be that they 
are often supply-driven, do not correspond to industry needs, and are of inadequate quality. Various 
mechanisms can be applied to secure the relevance and reach of such efforts, e.g. requiring them to 
be more demand-driven, requiring that part of the budget is covered by fees; conducting joint 
public/private projects to secure relevance and reach; securing private sector input in management 
and operations; and conducting applied technological work rather than basic science. 
 The rationales for more mundane industrial extension services are the same as those for the 
more specialised activities related to science and technology. A well-functioning metrology, 
standards, testing, and quality assurance (MSTQ) system is central to the upgrading of local firms 
and to facilitating both local co-operation and international marketability. An electronics working 
group was formed in Taiwan in the mid-1960s to assist companies in such areas as marketing, co-
ordinating production with the demands of foreign buyers, procuring raw materials, training 
personnel, improving quality, and speeding up bureaucratic approval procedures. In Korea, the 
setting of industrial standards increased the local diffusion of technology (Kim & Dahlman 1992). 
 It has been argued that government-business deliberation councils contributed significantly to 
the economic success of some of the East Asian countries (World Bank 1993). They are fora which 
                                                 
11 (1) a technology transfer centre provided industries with information regarding alternative technologies available 
abroad and their suppliers, and assisted in preparation of contracts; (2) technical information centres collected and 
disseminated scientific technical information; (3) technical extension service agencies assisted firms in improving 
product quality, training, factory automation, etc.; and (4) public R&D institutes undertook joint research with 
industries, and supplied information on technology sources which enhanced the bargaining position of local firms 
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bring together various stakeholders, government, business, labour, consumers, academia, and the 
press to discuss policy, market trends, exchange information in general, and formulate visions for 
future development. The organisation of industries into associations was particularly encouraged in 
Japan and smoothed these kinds of deliberations. Additionally, industry associations can support 
their constituencies in various ways, strengthen intra-industry co-operation, and provide services for 
their members. This corresponds to the more general arguments of the ‘institutionalists’ referred to 
in section 2.3.2. 
 Due to the inherent uncertain and long-term nature of scientific and technological activities, 
finance poses a special problem. ‘Anglo-Saxon’ capital market-based financial systems are usually 
taken to favour short-term profit-oriented investments, whereas in credit-based financial systems, 
often associated with Germany and Japan, creditors tend to be more engaged in long-term growth-
oriented investments and there are closer associations between financial institutions and firms 
(Whitley 1999). In Korea, the government established various funds aimed at supporting activities, 
which traditionally have difficulties raising capital, such as technological development, small 
technology start-ups, R&D, equipment modernisation, and plant automation. It also took steps to 
create financial institutions specifically catering to the needs of new technology-based firms and to 
establish a venture capital industry, primarily based on public firms. The Singaporean government 
has also actively nurtured venture capital institutions. Even though financial market interventions 
were common in the East Asian NICs, they are risky and less feasible today, but if properly targeted 
and monitored a case for such interventions can still be made (Lall 1998). 
 
Regulatory framework 
Various features of the regulatory framework, beyond the basic ‘rules of the game’ recognised in 
the market-friendly view, have a bearing on processes of technological development. Here we 
consider regulations related to technology transfer, the encouragement of export activities, 
competition, foreign investment, intellectual property right protection, and development plans. 
 Government may intervene to increase technology transfer or improve the terms under which it 
is conducted. Government may stimulate the participation of local agents in the transfer and 
absorption of imported technological packages by providing subsidies and fiscal incentives for local 
involvement. An alternative strategy is to guide or subsidise TNCs to enter targeted activities or 
conduct R&D locally (Singapore). Today, FDI restrictions are less feasible, and an alternative 
strategy is to encourage TNCs to conduct higher value-added activities locally through large 
investments in education/training and through upgrading of local suppliers, infrastructure and 
support institutions. Developing countries licensees are often disadvantaged vis-à-vis foreign 
licensors. They may not be aware of alternative suppliers or be able to assess the commercial value 
of a license, possibly resulting in higher licensing fees or overly restrictive agreements, e.g. 
restrictions on local adaptations, requirements that the licensee informs the licensor about 
adaptations, or export restrictions. Governments may impose limits on royalty payments or be able 
to achieve favourable changes in the terms of licensing agreements, e.g. through information 
dissemination or through their ability to control the access of licensors to the domestic market. 
Korea and Japan carefully screened licensing agreements, particularly to avoid export restrictions. 
Korea’s restrictive policies towards FDI and foreign licenses induced companies to acquire foreign 
technology in the form of capital goods and turnkey plants. A slight overvaluation of the local 
currency and tariff exemptions on imported capital goods facilitated these forms of transfers. At a 
certain point, in the early 1980s, Korean government relaxed its policy on FDI and foreign licenses 
to facilitate advanced technology transfers, which were only possible if foreign partners could retain 
control.  In Taiwan, the Electronics Research and Service Organisation (ERSO)12 licensed 
technology from abroad and subsequently sub-licensed it to local firms to avoid price-raising 
                                                 
12 The publicly owned ERSO was set up in 1974 with the purpose of acquiring semiconductor design and production 
capability by recruiting a foreign partner to help develop and commercialise the technology. 
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competition among them. 
 Another universally recognised factor underpinning the economic growth of East Asian nations 
is their early push towards exports, which imposed dynamic incentives upon firms for upgrading 
and efficiency and provided them with various learning opportunities. Nelson (1996) finds that 
effective innovation depends on whether the combination of fiscal, monetary, and trade policies 
encourages exporting and, more specifically, that the extent to which firms quickly tried to compete 
on world markets was a major determinant of the success of infant industry protection programmes. 
In Korea, while the small domestic market was protected to foster infant industries, from early on 
government pushed and pulled companies to compete in export markets to obtain economies of 
scale. This also imposed stringent cost and quality requirements on the exporters, which required 
companies to acquire, master, and adapt/develop technology. Export activities also brought 
companies in contact with foreign OEM buyers from whom technology was transferred in the 
process of securing processes and products in accordance with buyer requirements. Korea applied 
export subsidies and suasion to push companies to export and to compensate for an overvalued 
exchange rate and protected domestic market. While export subsidies are inapplicable in the current 
international commercial climate, various forms of institutional support may be considered to attain 
export orientation.  
 In Korea and Taiwan, firms were not only required to compete in export markets. While the 
domestic market was protected from foreign imports and investments, this was combined with 
fierce domestic competition. Competition in the domestic market was gradually increased along 
with the liberalisation of imports and foreign investments. This increased the pressure on local firms 
to compete on the basis of innovation. A special non-market competitive mechanism discussed in 
the ‘Miracle Study’ was the conduction of ‘contests’: in Korea and Japan, firms were encouraged to 
cooperate and the number of competing firms was kept down to be able to attain scale. Instead of 
having a large number of independent firms compete in markets, ‘contests’ were instrumental in 
avoiding inefficiency and collusion: firms were required to compete for government-controlled 
scarce resources, particularly credit, foreign exchange, licenses to initiate or expand activities, and 
import protection. These favours were then granted according to export performance and 
international competitiveness. Thus, the East Asian experience suggests that it is important to 
combine protection with competition to prevent inefficient allocation of resources and to curb rent-
seeking. 
 Foreign direct investment is an important source of technology, but there are risks inherent to 
relying too heavily on foreign technology, and industrial policy consequently needs to distinguish 
between enterprise ownership: TNCs can bring definite advantages to industrialisation processes 
with the capital, skills, technology, and market access they command, but since they tend to exploit 
static comparative advantages and retain advanced activities elsewhere, interventions may be 
needed to encourage them to ‘deepen’ local production and conduct more dynamic and complex 
activities locally. This might take the form of changing incentives to encourage local technological 
activity (as in Singapore) or restricting foreign entry and encouraging and supporting local 
companies to develop R&D and other technological capabilities themselves (Korea and Japan). In 
the short-term and to the individual company, simple import or licensing may appear cheaper, even 
though there may be long-term advantages associated with the adaptation of imported equipment, 
and even though the cost of such efforts is likely to decline as firms gradually learn how to perform 
them. Technological efforts on the part of firms can reduce the cost of technology imports, increase 
the ability to exploit new technological opportunities, and reduce dependence on imports. In Korea 
and Taiwan, restrictions on FDI were used as part of a strategy to build local capabilities. Although 
emerging industries did have to rely on foreign components, machinery and know-how, local 
entrepreneurial and managerial talent were nurtured. This, however, requires a considerable base of 
human resources and entrepreneurial talent to ensure that local efforts can actually substitute for 
technology imports.  
 At the early stages of development, lenient intellectual property right laws facilitate local 
imitation of foreign products and processes, but later on when local companies themselves become 
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able to undertake development work, lax laws may discourage local development efforts. More 
strict laws, on the other hand, make it imperative for firms to acquire foreign technology or step up 
their own R&D. Accordingly, one could envision systems of flexible and variable protection, 
contingent on the industry or activity in question and its state of development as being 
developmentally superior. But today, developing country governments have less leeway in this 
respect: intellectual property right protection with respect to patents, copyright, and brand-name 
laws is more diligently pursued globally through the WTO and other fora. 
 Governments commonly formulate development plans related to economic development and 
establish special bodies to devise them and oversee their implementation. The plans typically reflect 
ambitions to shift from a low to a high technology growth path by taking on more complex 
industrial activities, increasing local value added in production and design, increasing local 
innovative activities, etc. Besides determining areas of direct government activism, such plans 
constitute part of the incentive structure influencing the direction and intensity of private efforts. 
Plans commonly set growth targets, specify promoted activities, identify areas particularly suitable 
for local development or for joint local/foreign development, and co-ordinate efforts between 
different activities or sectors. In both Taiwan and Korea development plans were prominent. Quite 
early (1967), the Korean government created a Ministry of Science and Technology to coordinate 
the technology-related activities of other ministries.  
 
The Four Approaches to Economic Embeddedness 
So, which specific entities and issues did these various approaches consider? The table below 
summarises their main focal points. The table brings out more clearly a deviation of the literature on 
business systems from the other perspectives: the business system approach is mainly analytical, 
while the other perspectives have a more prescriptive flavour.
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Table 3.1: Main issues addressed in approaches to economic embeddedness 
 
 NSI Business systems ITD Industrial policy 
General policies 
(incentives) 
Policies towards  
- competition 
- intellectual property rights 
 
Dominance of the state and its 
willingness to share risks with 
private owners 
State antagonism to collective 
intermediaries 
Extent of formal regulation of 
markets 
Macroeconomic policies 
Foreign competition 
Domestic competition 
Competition 
Technology 
policies 
Policies towards industrial innovation  Technology imports, FDI, promotion of 
local R&D, other interventions to 
strengthen ITD 
Technology transfer 
Export push 
FDI regime 
IP protection 
Development plans 
Government-business 
deliberation 
Labour and skills Education and training system (including 
quality and attitudes instilled) 
Labour-management relations 
Strength of public training system 
and of state-employer-union 
collaboration 
Strength of independent labour 
unions 
Strength of labour organisations 
based on certified expertise 
Centralisation of bargaining 
Skills in the areas of 
- worker and supervisory 
- technical 
- production engineering 
- design and development 
- scientific and basic research 
- managerial, organisational, marketing 
HR development 
Information and 
technical support 
Level and organisation of R&D activities 
and sources of its funding 
Roles of universities 
 Knowledge of the need for ITD effort 
Knowledge of kind of effort to promote 
ITD 
Access to information from other firms, 
institutions, universities, etc. 
Standards, metrology, testing facilities 
Technical extension services 
Contract research, design, training 
Information services on technical 
sources, trends 
Basic research support 
Access to technological information 
worldwide 
S&T infrastructure 
Industrial extension 
Economic agents    Capable firms 
‘Specialised technological 
agents’ 
Infant industries 
Public enterprises 
Industrial 
organisation 
Characteristics of important firms and 
industries (internal organisation of firms; 
inter-firm relationships) 
Firm-internal R&D labs 
User-producer interaction 
  Supporting industries, 
subcontracting, SMIs 
Inter-firm cooperation, e.g. 
in R&D, rationalisation 
Finance  Institutional set-up of the financial sector Capital market vs. credit-based 
financial system 
Availability of finance at appropriate 
rates and in sufficient quantity for 
R&D 
Equity-sharing finance for innovators 
Special finance for small and medium 
enterprises 
Finance 
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General Requirements to Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy obviously needs to be tailored to its particular targets and their context. 
Consequently it is difficult to formulate policy requirements at a general level. However, experience 
shows and common sense dictates that government bureaucracy should be sufficiently capable to 
devise policies and carry them out; that policies need to be continuously monitored and adjusted; 
that policy focus in a given area should gradually shift from technology search, acquisition, and 
assimilation to indigenous improvements and innovation; that targeted activities should only deviate 
incrementally from the existing capability base; that targeted activities can gradually be performed 
with greater reliance on markets; that support should be tied to performance requirements; that 
policies should be truly selective; and that policies should be wide and flexible. We will expand on 
these points in the following. 
 Government support for technological activities is not a mere technical issue but is contingent 
on sufficient government capacities in both policy formulation and implementation and on socio-
political issues related to the economy in question. History is littered with examples of governments 
intervening in counterproductive ways retarding technological development, efficiency, export 
growth, and structural change (Lall 1992; World Bank 1991), and Lall (1992) recognises that few 
governments possess the capacities to intervene on the scale it has been done in Korea. In the 
absence of such capacities, broader functional interventions at a subsectoral level may be 
preferable, leaving it to market forces to sort out the best enterprises and technologies. Pack and 
Westphal (1986), among others, prescribe that if the requisite government capacities are lacking, it 
is better to adhere to neoclassical prescriptions for a neutral policy regime. On the other hand, if 
there are indeed the benefits associated with selective interventions which a wide range of authors 
believe, a more reasonable recommendation would seem to be to initiate efforts directed at 
enhancing government capacities. Just as productivity and growth in manufacturing depend on the 
gradual and painstaking accumulation of technological capabilities, so does the effectiveness of 
government interventions depend on adequate administrative and organisational capacities. The 
acquisition of these capacities are subject to the same uncertainties, learning costs and economies, 
etc. as those associated with manufacturing technology.  
 Policies need to be continuously monitored and government needs to be able to respond in an 
effective and timely manner. Pack and Westphal (1986) assert that ‘[..] selective intervention can 
bring successful results only to the degree that it entails successive implementation and 
reformulation of detailed strategy through the accumulation of information relevant to judging 
progress toward an unambiguous objective’ (p. 103).  It has also been suggested that there are 
significant externalities associated with the information gathering during the course of monitoring 
from which private industry may benefit. The, by many accounts, failure of the Korean heavy and 
chemicals industry drive is usually ascribed to government being unusually unable or unwilling to 
respond to indications that projects were performing badly.  
 Since late industrialisers tend to advance from replication of mature products and technologies 
towards indigenous adaptations, improvements, and innovations, there is obviously a sequencing to 
interventions: at an early stage, focus is most appropriately placed on the acquisition and 
assimilation of proven technologies, and techniques such as capital goods imports, learning-by-
doing, and reverse engineering are to a large extent sufficient. Later, indigenous development 
efforts become more relevant to maintain competitiveness in the face of rising local costs and 
increasing competition from low wage locations, more reluctant technology transfer from developed 
country competitors, pressures to tighten IP protection, and possibly protectionist counter measures 
in advanced markets.  
 Since learning is cumulative and incremental, interventions are more likely to succeed if they 
support activities that have a base in existing skills and knowledge in a country. New technological 
‘leaps’ must be modest, based on realistic assessments of what is feasibly attainable within 
reasonable periods of time.  
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 It is a sensible assumption that government intervention is more needed in the early stages of an 
industry’s development and can subsequently be scaled down. The most significant feature of 
Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese industrial policy, according to Pack and Westphal (1986), is a 
‘dual policy structure’ between industries in which the countries already had comparative advantage 
and those in which they did not. In the former case, industries were subject to a neutral incentive 
regime, in the latter various forms of selective interventions were applied, e.g. credit rationing and 
preferences, import quotas and tariffs, licensing controls, tax preference on income from exporting 
and other tax inducements.  They find that successful selective intervention in East Asian countries 
has been characterised by being exactly that, selective. The development of distinctly new 
capabilities for existing or new industries was only attempted in a few areas at a time, while at the 
same time, the use of already existing capabilities was left to market forces operating in response to 
largely neutral incentives.  
 The East Asian experiences show that promotion and protection should be limited, combined 
with competition in the domestic market, include a phasing-down schedule, and be conditional upon 
performance requirements such as export and productivity increase targets. To avoid spreading 
scarce resources too thinly, selectivity is at the heart of industrial policy.13 An appropriate balance 
between reliance on imported technology and local efforts needs to be struck, and some areas, 
sectors, and activities promoted while others not. Finally, overly specific and narrow policies are 
inherently risky: if investments are associated with large sunk costs or specific assets, the costs of 
becoming locked into an inappropriate development path would be considerable. This implies that 
strategies should be based on wide search, variety, experimentation, and some slack and 
redundancy. Flexibility, the extent to which goals can be altered and strategies revised and adjusted 
with modest delay and cost, becomes a quality in its own right. 
 
NEPAD: Background and Purpose 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is the latest grand attempt to set out a 
continent-wide development programme.14 Its long-term objectives are poverty eradication, 
sustainable development, demarginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and promotion of 
the role of women in all activities (NEPAD 2001). 
 Even though the initiative has met with a variety of criticism, it is nevertheless widely deemed 
as the best chance the continent has had for years of ensuring that its concerns are heard widely in 
the international community. It has the necessary boldness and simplicity to move African concerns 
up the agenda of the G8 and the OECD and has already succeeded in doing so. 
 NEPAD emerged at the joint conference of Africa’s ministers of finance and economic planning 
in May 2001. It is strongly promoted as African in origin and Africa-driven, though this 
characterisation is questioned by some for reasons we will return to in the following. 
                                                 
13 It is a prominent theme in the debate on industrial policy whether interventions should be ‘functional’ or ‘selective’. 
Selective interventions are interventions directed towards specific industries or clusters, generic technologies, 
regions, or even firms (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Pack & Westphal 1986; Lall 1996), such as the creation of 
particular types of skills, the setting up of institutions to promote particular ‘strategic’ technologies, the financing of 
‘mission oriented’ research, the granting of infant industry protection or subsidies, the channelling of local or foreign 
investments into particular activities, or negotiating with and regulating international investment and technology 
transfers to achieve technological objectives. Functional interventions (World Bank 1993) are interventions with a 
more uniform effect in an economy, such as human resource development, general infrastructure provision, export 
promotion, and openness to international technology flows. Selective interventions are far more complicated to 
accomplish since they need to be highly context specific and evolve over time. Moreover, the highly different paths 
taken by the East Asian NICs suggests that there is no single package of interventions that will ensure success.  Lall 
and Teubal (1998) introduce an intermediate policy category, ‘horizontal policies’..  
14 But it is not the first: the Financial Times quotes a G7 official for saying that there have been some 18 Africa 
development initiatives in the last 20 years (Beattie&Lamont 2002). For brief reviews of some earlier initiatives, see 
(Stefański 2002; Akinrinade 2002). Proponents argue that leadership and African ownership as well as a new set of 
circumstances makes this initiative different. 
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 The stated aim of NEPAD is to achieve the overall 7 per cent annual growth necessary for 
Africa to meet one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): halving poverty by 2015.15 It is 
estimated that Africa needs a yearly transfer of US$64 billion to meet this target, a tall order 
compared to the current transfer of US$10 billion. The envisioned sources of transfer are increased 
debt relief, aid, investment and market access. 
 NEPAD covers four broad areas which are defined as prerequisites for the success of the 
programme: Peace and Security; Democracy and Political Governance; Economic and Corporate 
Governance; and Sub-regional and Regional Approaches to Development. 
 
Genesis and Relations to the African Union 
NEPAD needs to be understood on the basis of its historical genesis and its relation to the parallel 
project of the African Union.  
The AU 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was first created in 1963 by 32 independent African 
states to promote co-operation among African states towards self-government and social progress. 
Over the years however, the OAU acquired a reputation of not being very effective and with the end 
of apartheid and the rehabilitation of South Africa into regional politics, a need was perceived to 
start afresh with a new mandate. A further impetus came when the long-aspiring pan-Africanist,  
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, proposed the immediate declaration of a politically unified ‘United 
States of Africa’ at the Extraordinary Session of the OAU  in September 1999 in Sirte, Libya. This 
proposal was too dramatic for most governments and instead the Session decided to set up a 
committee of experts to design an African Union. A Constitutive Act was adopted a year later at the 
OAU Lome summit, and the African Union was officially launched in July 2002 in Durban, South 
Africa with a First Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union. 
 The African Union encompasses 53 of the continent’s 54 countries16. It is more ambitious than 
the OAU and envisions a faster and closer political and economic integration across the whole 
continent. It is to a large extent modelled on the EU and it plans seventeen Union institutions 
including a Commission, a Pan African Parliament, an African Court, an African Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council (ECOSOC), and various unitary financial institutions.  
 
The NEPAD 
Regional economic integration has long been an aspiration in Africa: the ‘Lagos Plan of Action’ for 
economic integration was adopted in 1977 and in 1991 the ‘Abuja Treaty’, which planned the 
gradual establishment of an African Economic Community over a period of 34 years. Subregional 
integration has also been proceeding, with moves towards monetary union in West Africa, the 
revitalisation of the East African Community of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and other initiatives. 
 The primary champions behind the NEPAD have been the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, 
Senegal, and Algeria:17 Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, Abdoulaye Wade, and Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika. The initiative emerged in Algiers in May 2001 when the joint conference of Africa’s 
ministers of finance and economic planning decided to merge three preceding and similar initiatives 
                                                 
15 This would mean more than doubling the current yearly growth rate of 3.3 per cent. Since the early 1980, real GDP 
growth has averaged only 2.5 per cent (Funke&Nsouli 2003) and with population growth rates in excess of 2 per cent 
per annum real per capita growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa were negative on average throughout the whole period 
1975-1999 (Loxley 2003). 
16 Morocco is not a member because of the organisation’s recognition of the ‘Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic,’ the 
self-proclaimed government of Western Sahara, which is under Moroccan administration.  
17 In addition to South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria, Egypt is often included as a fifth country behind the 
initiation of NEPAD. 
20 
into one: The Millenium Partnership for Africa’s Recovery Programme (MAP), the OMEGA Plan, 
and the Compact for African Recovery.18 The new initiative was first named simply the ‘New 
African Initiative’. The July 2001 OAU summit in Lusaka then mandated an implementation 
committee of 15 heads of state to manage it and in October the committee renamed it the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and established its secretariat in South Africa. 
 NEPAD is a compromise between the emphasis of each of the three preceding initiatives: the 
MAP and the OMEGA Plan especially focussed on investment in various forms of infrastructure. 
The ECA’s Compact was the perhaps the most substantive of the initiatives but lacking strong 
government backing, it is less visible in the NEPAD documentation (de Waal 2002). However, the 
core NEPAD ideas of ‘enhanced partnership’, mutual accountability towards development 
outcomes and peer review, which we will return to below, were all developed in the Compact 
document. 
 
The AU-NEPAD relationship 
NEPAD’s relationship with the African Union is important, yet still unclear. Formally, NEPAD has 
been described both as a ‘programme in support of the African Union’ and as a ‘mandated initiative 
of the African Union’. NEPAD is most commonly thought of as the economic and social 
programme of the AU. On the other hand, de Waal (2002) suggests that NEPAD is also an attempt 
to evade the slow and unruly process of the OAU/African Union: the key leaders of the initiative, 
especially President Mbeki, were wary of the dangers of it being derailed by the interference of 
small, ill-governed countries wanting to ensure that their voices were heard and their rulers paid off.  
 Even though  Libyan influence on the process has diminished as the African Union has moved 
into the mainstream of regional institutional politics, Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika 
were also concerned that tying NEPAD into the OAU/African Union would expose it too much to 
Libyan influence, with immediate adverse consequences for the receptivity of OECD and G8 
donors. Hence, the linkage between the OAU/AU and NEPAD has remained largely at the level of 
rhetoric and there is little convergence between the institutional structure of the two: there is no AU 
control, let alone veto, over NEPAD. 
 
‘Enhanced Partnerships’ and the APRM 
At the core of the NEPAD lies two important and novel concepts: the notion of ‘enhanced 
partnerships’ and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which hold the potential to 
substantially transform the aid relationship. The ‘enhanced partnership’ is put forth as a principle of 
joint responsibility and mutual accountability: rather than donor-imposed conditionalities, which 
have proved ineffective and burdensome in the past, ‘enhanced partnerships’ are to represent 
common commitments by African countries and donors to a set of development outcomes defined 
by African countries, whereby donors pool funds, guarantee them for an extended period and 
channel them through budgetary processes, which are then jointly monitored on the basis of 
outcomes.  
 The notion of ‘enhanced partnership’ sets NEPAD apart from the AU: whereas the AU has no 
criterion for membership except being located in Africa, participation in ‘enhanced partnerships’ is 
                                                 
18 Then MAP began with a mandate given by OAU to President Mbeki along with President Olusegun Obasanjo of 
Nigeria and President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, to investigate how Africa could overcome its debt crisis. It 
was inspired especially by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and his vision of the ‘African Renaissance’, 
which encompassed not just economic development, but cultural, social and political regeneration too. The second 
component, the OMEGA Plan of Senegal’s president, Abdoulaye Wade, was initiated later, in the early months of 
2001, and focussed on regional infrastructural and educational projects. The third, the Compact for African 
Recovery, was initiated by the executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, K.Y. Amoako, 
under a mandate by African ministers of finance in late 2000.  
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contingent upon meeting certain standards of governance and economic management.19 This 
introduces a politically very sensitive element of discrimination among African countries.  
 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is similar to the peer review in the OECD, which 
is regarded as a successful means of identifying and promoting appropriate practices: African 
countries are to monitor each other’s progress according to a set of benchmarks and the scheme 
specifies an ambitious range of targets for conflict prevention, good governance, poverty reduction 
and disease control, including HIV/AIDS. The expectation is that this will introduce a pressure on  
badly performing countries to do better. 
 The aspiration is that the integrity and standard of the reviews will be sufficiently high for the 
donors to abandon their own monitoring process and accept the outcomes of the APRM. Reviews 
are not intended to be imposed on countries; rather countries should step forward for review 
themselves. One of the greatest incentives is the promise of debt relief. If the mechanism is 
implemented, a small group of well-performing countries are likely to step forward for review and 
the reward will be entry into ‘enhanced partnerships’ under which they will receive increased aid 
and investment.  
 
NEPAD and the Donors 
The progress of the NEPAD is obviously critically dependent on its reception by the donor 
community, and it has generally been received with applause and enthusiasm. This is perhaps little 
surprising given that the ideas that underpin NEPAD, specifically that on ‘enhanced partnership’, 
were strongly influenced by emergent best practices on the part of a number of like-minded donors, 
e.g. the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries.20  By some, NEPAD is even 
seen as an excessive accommodation to donor preferences, as we will return to below. 
 NEPAD is also generally well-aligned with what was dubbed the ‘Monterrey consensus’ at the 
Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey in March 2002, which inter alia stresses that 
more aid should be channelled to the ‘good performers’; that developing countries should assume 
more responsibility for their own development processes; and that international trade and foreign 
direct investment are the primary drivers of development.  
 In Monterrey an additional US$12 billion per year were pledged for global development 
assistance by 2006. Shortly afterwards, at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, the G8 agreed 
that half or more of this money could go to Africa, to those countries that ‘govern justly, invest in 
their own people and promote economic freedom’. If implemented, this would represent an increase 
by almost 50 per cent of the US$10 billion development assistance to Africa in 2002. But of course, 
as always in politics, formal policies and plans are not necessarily consistent with eventual 
implementation. 
 Also in Kananaskis, where African leaders were allowed to attend for the first time (Stefanski 
2002), the G8 adopted an Africa Action Plan (AAP) in response to NEPAD, which spelled out how 
the G8 perceives the NEPAD and their role in it: 
 
[NEPAD] is, first and foremost, a pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate 
democracy and sound economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred 
development [...] [African Leaders] have formally undertaken to hold each other accountable for its 
achievement. They have emphasized good governance and human rights as necessary preconditions for 
Africa’s recovery. They focus on investment-driven economic growth and economic governance as the 
engine for poverty reduction [...]. (G8 2002) 
 
                                                 
19 Formally though, Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the Union stipulates that only governments, which come to 
power through constitutional means, should be admitted to the AU. 
20 For example, Britain’s Department for International Development (DfID) has been experimenting with guaranteeing 
long-term assistance flows through the budgetary process to Rwanda and has been supporting participatory Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers in a number of countries (de Wall 2002). 
22 
It is clear from the Africa Action Plan that the G8 countries will not decide en-bloc to transfer aid 
and other resources to African nations. Rather, each of the G8 countries reserves the right to decide 
with which African countries they want to partner and when and how. Individual G8 countries 
decide ‘on the basis of measured results’ which countries they would want to form partnerships 
with but in doing so they will be informed by the results of the peer review process NEPAD is 
putting into place. Yet, the G8 welcomes partnership based more on African priorities than on 
donor assumption of Africa’s requirements.  
 Even though Jacques Chirac had announced that the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian, France, should 
focus on Africa and development, a plethora of other economic and political issues, including the 
war in Iraq, pushed development issues far down the agenda. Chirac did however call on fellow G8 
members to make good on the pledge to provide an extra US$6 billion a year in aid to Africa. 
 The United Nations and the OECD have adopted NEPAD as the basis upon which to build 
future relations with Africa.21 But the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) set up in 
November 2002, may seem at odds with the thrust of NEPAD: the MCA is US$ 5 billion of new aid 
money to be dispensed to those countries, which score highly on a specific benchmark system 
measuring good governance, economic liberties and delivery. By acquiring recipients to comply to 
a set of pre-specified criteria this appears to run counter to the principles of indigenous aid agendas 
and African peer reviews.22 
 
Criticisms of the NEPAD 
NEPAD has already met with a variety of criticism from both within the continent and from 
outside: From outside, the willingness of observers from two of the main architects behind the 
NEPAD, South Africa and Nigeria, to endorse the outcome of the elections in Zimbabwe in March 
2002, in spite of rigging and intimidation, met with stark criticism and was interpreted as 
questioning the sincerity of the NEPAD agenda of promoting good governance, democracy and the 
rule of law. Even though some argue that the Zimbabwe issue it outside the scope of NEPAD and 
that it should not be expected to pass judgement on it (de Waal 2002; African Business 2003), this 
may be too fine a distinction for some donors to make. More recently, in April 2003 President 
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, one of the architects of NEPAD, was declared the winner of an 
election described by European Union observers as ‘marred by serious irregularities and fraud’ 
(Peel 2003). 
 NEPAD has also been widely criticised from within the continent. NEPAD has been designed 
by experts and adopted by governments with little public consultation; there has been no 
involvement of Parliaments or consultations with civil society in the plan’s construction. At least in 
the longer term, this impedes NEPAD’s own agenda of strengthening popular ownership and 
promoting democracy.  
 In late 2001 and early 2002, virtually every major African civil society organisation, network 
and progressive personality attacked NEPAD’s process, form and content (Bond 2003).23
 According to Adebayo Olukoshi (2003), executive secretary of the Council for the Development 
                                                 
21 UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/57/2 adopted NEPAD as the general framework around which the 
international community including the United Nations system should concentrate its efforts for Africa’s 
development. 
22 Instead of dispensing the yearly US$5 billion MCA funds through international organisations and USAID, the Bush 
administration has set up a new organisation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which is envisioned to enter 
into business-like contracts with individual African states. Furthermore, the administration intended to only apply 
Congress for an initial allocation of US$1.7 billion and it is likely that only US$7-800 million will eventually be 
allocated. 
23 In April 2002 a number of African intellectuals and organisational representatives met at the Third World Network 
conference in Accra, Ghana and adopted a ‘Declaration on Africa’s Development Challenges’ very critical of the 
NEPAD: NEPAD is characterised as being neo-liberal and perpetuating those structural adjustment principles, which 
proved negative to many constituencies on the continent. It also finds that the population has not been sufficiently 
consulted in its perception and that the plan is primarily designed to cater for ‘the foreign donors’. 
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of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), the initiative represents a self-imposition of the 
tenets of neo-liberalism, structural adjustment and the donor conditionalities of the 1980s and 
1990s, even though the orthodox structural adjustment framework is widely deemed as having had 
adverse effects for African development. It is designed to cater for donor interests rather than to 
reform the development agenda. 
 Based on an elaborate analysis of the neo-patrimonial underpinnings of African politics, Chabal 
(2002) seriously questions the prospects of both democratisation and the NEPAD. He finds that 
NEPAD reflects a continuation rather than a break from the type of relations that has guided the 
continent’s engagement with the international community since independence and as a commitment 
on the part of African elites to secure the continued transfer of resources to Africa. 
 
Recent Developments and Progress  
Which concrete progress has the NEPAD made then, in the two years it has been in existence? Too 
many words and not enough action many appears to feel (African Business 2003; Economist 2002). 
Trevor Manuel, South Africa’s finance minister, has remarked: ‘Ministers have been saying that 
they have talked about Nepad at more than seven meetings and they now want to move to some 
action. Implementation is the issue now’ (Lamont 2002b). In his speech at the latest meeting of 
NEPAD’s 20-member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee meeting in May 
2003, President Mbeki criticised the commitment of Africa leaders to the NEPAD: only seven or 
eight leaders were present at the meeting and only 10 governments had ratified the protocol to 
establish a peace and security council to intervene in conflicts on the continent. And at the AU 
Summit in Durban in July 2002, many rich countries were disappointed when NEPAD leaders 
presented exactly what the initiative was supposed not to: a shopping list of large infrastructure 
projects to be funded by donors (Beattie 2002; Lamont 2002a).  
 During the first year of NEPAD’s existence, the international financial community has met it 
with diplomatic enthusiasm but did not come up with any meaningful funding. At Evian however, a 
number of concrete targets for increase in donor funding were set (G8 2003), and commitments 
were made to a number of  the infrastructure projects proposed by NEPAD (Battersby 2003). 
NEPAD must also be credited with having achieved to push Africa visibly up the international 
agenda, e.g. at Monterrey, Kananaskis, Evian, and the 2003 World Economic Forum Africa Summit 
in Durban in June.  
 When evaluating the progress it is also important to note that the different components of 
NEPAD are accorded different priority: the economic and corporate governance peer review 
mechanism is central in defining ‘enhanced partnerships’ and in unlocking increased development 
finance and is accorded the highest priority. The other governance and peace and security  
components of the initiative are still in preliminary stages of discussion (de Waal 2002). Peer 
reviews of political governance, when and if it is implemented, will be a wholly new practice that 
has not been tried anywhere in the world.24  
 In the past year, six prominent Africans have been appointed to the peer review unit, which is 
scheduled to start its work in July 2003. But with only 15 of the 53 member countries of the AU 
having signed up for peer review, the enthusiasm for what could be the core of the NEPAD concept 
may appear limited.25 
 
                                                 
24 The track record of democratisation is not altogether bad: if Nigeria is included, 17 of Africa’s 54 nations are now 
considered fully fledged or emerging democracies, compared with around four at the end of the 1980s. In three years 
elected governments in three countries, Senegal, Ghana and Kenya, have handed over power peacefully after being 
voted out and this is a rare occurrence in Africa. But in Zimbabwe political repression has become worse, Ivory 
Coast is balancing on the verge of breakdown, and Africa’s first military coup in more than three years took place in 
March in the Central African Republic (Peel&White 2003). 
25 South Africa, Algeria, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Mali, Cameroon, Gabon, Burkina Faso and Senegal. 
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The NEPAD Strategy and the Role of S&T  
Having accounted for the genesis and the general features of the NEPAD, we will now turn more to 
its specifics: which concrete areas does the strategy target and which measures does it propose to 
advance the political, economic, social and cultural progress of the continent? 
The NEPAD Strategy 
The programme of action in the base document of NEPAD (NEPAD 2001) identifies the following 
priority areas: 
 
Table 2  NEPAD priority areas 
 
A Conditions for Sustainable Development 
A1 The Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance Initiatives 
A2 The Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative 
A3 Sub-Regional and Regional Approaches to Development 
 
B Sectoral Priorities 
B1 Bridging the Infrastructure Gap 
B2 Human Resource Development Initiative, Including Reversing the Brain Drain 
B3 Agriculture 
B4 The Environment Initiative 
B5 Culture 
B6 Science and Technology Platforms 
 
C Mobilising Resources 
C1 The Capital Flows Initiative 
C2 The Market Access Initiative 
 
 
In the implementation plan the initiative proposes that some programmes be fast-tracked due to the 
need to sequence and prioritise, viz. communicable diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis), 
information and communication technology, debt reduction, and market access. The strategy duly 
recognises the shortcomings of a project based approach to development but finds that a number of 
crucial individual projects need to be implemented, e.g. in agriculture, private sector development, 
and infrastructure and regional development.26 
 
The Role of Science, Technology and Innovation 
We will now turn to looking more specifically on science, technology and innovation. Which role is 
it envisioned to play and which importance is it accorded with in the NEPAD process?  
 Academics and researchers, representatives of sub-regional bodies and government officials met 
to consider these exact issues at a NEPAD Workshop on Science and Technology in Johannesburg 
in February 2003. The aims of the workshop were to develop a NEPAD framework for science, 
technology and innovation, define priorities, align national strategies and strengthen co-operation.27 
                                                 
26 These projects are further specified in a separate document (NEPAD 2002). By June 2003, 41 out of 124 project on a 
‘high-priority shortlist’ had been initiated (Fabricius 2003). At the WEF Africa Economic Summit in Durban in June, 
a NEPAD ‘e-schools’ project was launched. The project aims to connect all African high schools to the Internet 
before year 2008 and all African primary schools before year 2013. 
27 The workshop followed shortly after a ministerial session of the Science and Technology Forum on Sustainable 
Development in September 2002. The session adopted an Ubuntu Minute on Science and Technology for Sustainable 
Development, which stated that science, research, technology and innovation are indispensable, fundamental engines 
of sustainable development and should not be seen as luxury items. It said research in developing countries should be 
based on these countries’ self-identified needs and called for the utilisation of science and technology in poverty 
alleviation and job creation. Another related event was the setting-up by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania of a joint 
Science and Technology Council under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) in January 2003. The 
Council is charged with boosting science and technology in the region through sharing and exchange of skills, fund 
25 
 The declaration adopted by the workshop spells out a number of agreed areas of concern related 
to the African science and technology system (NEPAD 2003): lack of information on research 
activities on the continent; insufficient co-operation across national boundaries; weak linkages 
between scientific institutions and industry; underestimation of the potential of science and 
technology to address poverty issues; outward mobility and loss of African scientists; low quality of 
science education; and R&D expenditures below one per cent of GDP for most African countries. 
A number of concrete measures are recommended to address these weaknesses, e.g. instituting a 
monitoring and evaluation system of S&T in Africa, inter alia to inform policy; ‘mainstreaming’ of 
science and technology into the existing NEPAD sectoral programmes, which include health, 
agriculture, education, environment, governance, infrastructure, security, and investment and trade; 
creation and strengthening of centres of excellence; establishment of regional research and 
innovation programmes focusing on  human development needs in for example space science, 
desertification, biotechnology and information technology.  
 The declaration also recommends that a special Forum on Science and Technology be 
established within NEPAD to push science and technology up the political agenda. The Forum 
should be made up of African science ministers and presidential advisors and supported by a panel 
of experts from science and industry and charged with identifying priority areas for African S&T. 
The declaration appeared to shy away from more sensitive issues such as intellectual property 
rights.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
How do the industrial policy issues and lessons discussed in the preceding sections apply to 
NEPAD’s economic policies? First of all, when exploring the applicability of lessons from East 
Asia on the NEPAD we should not overlook the obvious: that the so far weakly institutionalised 
pan-African initiative is not a strong East Asian state. History is littered with examples of 
governments intervening in counterproductive ways retarding technological development, 
efficiency, export growth, and structural change (Lall 1992; World Bank 1991). Lacking of such 
capacities, it is safer to adhere to a neutral policy regime or apply broader functional interventions, 
leaving it to market forces to sort out the best enterprises and technologies (Lall 1992; Pack and 
Westphal 1986). 
 However this is not the same as saying that the requisite institutional capacity could not or 
should not be developed. The World Bank recognises that state activism under the right 
circumstances leads to faster and more equitable growth (World Bank 1993, 1998). Developing 
such capacity would have to take into account that the political culture in Africa is generally very 
different from that in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Peter Evans (1995) identified 
‘embedded autonomy’, i.e. East Asian states’ concurrent embeddedness in and separation from the 
business community and wider society, as crucial for the success of their activist economic policies. 
African states generally function according to neopatrimonial principles and tend to be much less 
professionalised and less institutionally separated from society than their East Asian counterparts 
(Chabal 2002). 
 The most immediate and obvious recommendation is therefore that any success of NEPAD’s 
economic policies is contingent on further institution building and, based on what we saw 
concerning the initiative’s progress so far, broadening and deepening of political commitment. 
 If we assume that NEPAD was to develop as envisioned, which policy recommendations could 
our presentation imply? Among the most urgent issues in terms of African economic development 
are upgrading from agricultural produce and extraction industries and diversification of 
manufacturing production and this could be addressed by an array of the techniques discussed. 
Export orientation should be attempted from early on and techniques to encourage technology 
                                                                                                                                                                  
raising, co-ordination of training programmes and the possible establishment an East African University. Adressing 
the division of labour between the NEPAD and other existing regional organisations, Kanbur (2002) suggests that 
regional research capacity is perhaps better left to the African Development Bank. 
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transfer applied; any preferential treatment should be tied to performance requirements, e.g. export 
performance or productivity increases; attention should be paid to attaining scale economies, and 
subcontracting and specialisation promoted; the processes should be supported with appropriate 
demand-driven extension services, designed and managed with active business participation. 
 We saw that some techniques applied in the past are no longer permissible under the new 
international trade regime. It would be worthwhile then to evaluate more systematically how 
NEPAD might exploit the WTO provisions for ‘special and preferential treatment’ for the least 
developed countries. Export subsidies and selective government procurement are still permitted in 
most African countries. Furthermore, we discussed two specific institutional techniques which 
might also be applied in the context of NEPAD: ‘government-business deliberation councils’ to 
enhance the quality of policy deliberation and the commitment to their subsequent implementation, 
and the use of ‘contests’ in public procurement as a mechanism to combine co-operation and 
competition. 
 In the course of reviewing the four approaches to economic embeddedness and the East Asian 
development experiences, we identified a number of general requirements for industrial policies. It 
is reasonable to assume that these requirements may be extended as recommendations to the 
NEPAD process. The requirements were: a strong and capable bureaucracy; continual monitoring 
and adjustment of policies; a gradual upgrading of activities, e.g. from assimilation to innovation; 
an (only) incremental upgrade from base; imposition of performance requirements; true selectivity 
to avoid spreading scarce resources too thinly; and applying wide and flexible policies. 
 We saw that economic development in East Asia benefited from the externalities flowing from 
local planning, monitoring and evaluation of government policies. Short of leaving the 
administration of the new US aid initiative, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), entirely to 
African states, it is likely that the wider the reliance on local planning, monitoring and evaluation, 
the greater the benefit for African states.  Such local reliance could very well work through the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the enhanced partnerships. 
 The APRM has the potential to become an important instrument to strengthen innovation 
systems on the continent: peer reviews of good practice can stimulate policy learning (Dalum, 
Johnson, and Lundvall 1992) and thus provide a stronger institutional foundation for the promotion 
of innovation, competence building and industrial upgrading. 
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